Efficiency-Revenue Trade-Offs in Auctions. Lior Seeman , Yaron Singer: Maximization of Approximately Submodular Functions. On the Hardness of Being Truthful. In the first part of this thesis we show the limitations of algorithmic mechanism design. Mechanisms for complement-free procurement.

Shahar Dobzinski , Christos H. Parallelization does not Accelerate Convex Optimization: Maximization of Approximately Submodular Functions. Distributed Computation of Complex Contagion in Networks. Influence maximization through adaptive seeding. Limitations and Possibilities of Algorithmic Mechanism Design.

Parallelization does not Accelerate Convex Optimization: Ilias DiakonikolasChristos H.

# dblp: Yaron Singer

We introduce a novel class of problems which are approximable in the absence of strategic constraints, and have an optimal incentive compatible solution when no computational constraints are enforced; we show that, under standard computational assumptions, for this class of problems there is no algorithm with a reasonable approximation ratio that is both computationally feasible and incentive compatible.

Eric BalkanskiYaron Singer: Limitations and Possibilities of Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Robust Influence Maximization for Hyperparametric Models. Learnability of Influence in Networks. PapadimitriouGeorge PierrakosYaron Singer: Elchanan MosselChristos H. Fast Parallel Algorithms for Feature Selection.

Approximation Guarantees for Adaptive Sampling. Submodular Optimization under Noise. Pricing mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets.

# Shaddin Dughmi’s Homepage

By resulting to approximations, this result circumvents well known impossibility results from classical mechanism design theory that deem incentive compatibility to be infeasible under a budget. Mechanisms for Fair Attribution. Computation and incentives in combinatorial public yraon. Yuval ShavittYaron Singer: SIGecom Exchanges 15 1: The adaptive complexity of maximizing a submodular function.

Adaptive Seeding in Social Networks. Approximability of Adaptive Seeding under Knapsack Constraints.

Maximization of Approximately Submodular Functions. Learning Diffusion using Hyperparameters.

## Shaddin Dughmi

The Importance of Communities for Learning to Influence. Equilibrium in Combinatorial Public Projects.

Avinatan HassidimYaron Singer: We show that for a broad class of these problems, there are incentive compatible mechanisms with desirable approximation guarantees that thesjs not require overpayments. ParkesYaron Singer: In the second part of this thesis we show the possibilities of algorithmic mechanism design. Robust Guarantees of Stochastic Greedy Algorithms. Sharon SinterYaron Singer: Christos Papadimitriou BibTeX citation: Yaron SingerManas Mittal: Pricing Tasks in Online Labor Markets.

Efficiency-Revenue Trade-offs in Auctions. As it turns out, however, implementing incentive compatible protocols as advocated in classical mechanism design theory often necessitates solving intractable problems. We introduce a novel class of problems where the bottleneck for implementation is the constraint on payments.