Efficiency-Revenue Trade-Offs in Auctions. Lior Seeman , Yaron Singer: Maximization of Approximately Submodular Functions. On the Hardness of Being Truthful. In the first part of this thesis we show the limitations of algorithmic mechanism design. Mechanisms for complement-free procurement.
Shahar Dobzinski , Christos H. Parallelization does not Accelerate Convex Optimization: Maximization of Approximately Submodular Functions. Distributed Computation of Complex Contagion in Networks. Influence maximization through adaptive seeding. Limitations and Possibilities of Algorithmic Mechanism Design.
Parallelization does not Accelerate Convex Optimization: Ilias DiakonikolasChristos H.
dblp: Yaron Singer
We introduce a novel class of problems which are approximable in the absence of strategic constraints, and have an optimal incentive compatible solution when no computational constraints are enforced; we show that, under standard computational assumptions, for this class of problems there is no algorithm with a reasonable approximation ratio that is both computationally feasible and incentive compatible.
Eric BalkanskiYaron Singer: Limitations and Possibilities of Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Robust Influence Maximization for Hyperparametric Models. Learnability of Influence in Networks. PapadimitriouGeorge PierrakosYaron Singer: Elchanan MosselChristos H. Fast Parallel Algorithms for Feature Selection.
Approximation Guarantees for Adaptive Sampling. Submodular Optimization under Noise. Pricing mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets.
Shaddin Dughmi’s Homepage
By resulting to approximations, this result circumvents well known impossibility results from classical mechanism design theory that deem incentive compatibility to be infeasible under a budget. Mechanisms for Fair Attribution. Computation and incentives in combinatorial public yraon. Yuval ShavittYaron Singer: SIGecom Exchanges 15 1: The adaptive complexity of maximizing a submodular function.
Adaptive Seeding in Social Networks. Approximability of Adaptive Seeding under Knapsack Constraints.
Maximization of Approximately Submodular Functions. Learning Diffusion using Hyperparameters.
The Importance of Communities for Learning to Influence. Equilibrium in Combinatorial Public Projects.
Avinatan HassidimYaron Singer: We show that for a broad class of these problems, there are incentive compatible mechanisms with desirable approximation guarantees that thesjs not require overpayments. ParkesYaron Singer: In the second part of this thesis we show the possibilities of algorithmic mechanism design. Robust Guarantees of Stochastic Greedy Algorithms. Sharon SinterYaron Singer: Christos Papadimitriou BibTeX citation: Yaron SingerManas Mittal: Pricing Tasks in Online Labor Markets.
Efficiency-Revenue Trade-offs in Auctions. As it turns out, however, implementing incentive compatible protocols as advocated in classical mechanism design theory often necessitates solving intractable problems. We introduce a novel class of problems where the bottleneck for implementation is the constraint on payments.